Explaining the 'Dishonest Vote' in Italian Parliamentary Elections, 2006

Diego Garzia
(University of Siena)

Occasional Papers
No. 23/2010

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI SIENA
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE STORICHE, GIURIDICHE, POLITICHE E SOCIALI

CIRCaP

Direttore/Director: Maurizio Cotta

Segretario scientifico/Scientific Secretary: Nicolò Conti

Diego Garzia is a second year doctoral candidate at CIRCaP. Previously, he studied at the Universities of Roma (Sapienza) and Leiden (The Netherlands). His research is focused on the role of personality of both voters and politicians in orienting political attitudes and behavior, and his more recent works have been published in *Comunicazione Politica, Political Studies Review* and *Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science* (for which he actually serves as Editorial Board member).

Abstract:

Politicians are increasingly perceived as dishonest by mass publics (Dalton, 2004), and there are signs that voting behavior is being affected as a consequence. A growing tendency in democratic elections is that of casting a *dishonest vote* – that is, a vote cast in favor of a candidate which is perceived as dishonest by the voter himself. Our case study of the Italian election of 2006 is aimed at assessing the determinants of a form of political behavior that is likely to (further) cheapen the legitimacy of democratic institutions. The role that personal characteristics of both voters and candidates play in orienting electoral choices will be considered. Through a logistic regression analysis of Italian National Election Study (ITANES) data, it will be shown that the key determinant of the dishonest vote lies in the perception of every candidate as dishonest and, more generally, in the belief that politicians are *all the same.* Also, we will demonstrate that the probabilities of casting a dishonest vote are higher among certain kinds of voters – namely, those characterized by a lack of interest in politics and a comparatively lower degree of *civicness*.

1. Introduction[1]

Whether or not the dynamics of parliamentary elections have become more *presidential* (Poguntke and Webb, 2005), it is hard to deny that democratic politics is more *candidate-centred* (Wattenberg, 1991) than ever before. The changing structure of mass communications has been crucial in emphasizing the role of political leaders at the expense of parties, making the latter "more dependent in their communications with voters on the essentially visual and personality-based medium of television" (Mughan, 2000: 129). At the same time, the decline of cleavage voting (Franklin *et al.,* 1992) and partisan alignments (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000) have led to the increasing importance of politicians and their personalities in determining individual vote choice (Clarke *et al.,* 2004).

However, the fact that nowadays personal characteristics of politicians matter *more* does not mean that all characteristics matter *the same*. From a normative point of view, it has been observed that the most essential qualities to be found in a politician *should be* those associated with honesty and moral integrity. The reason is clear: politicians do their job in a place and in a manner that are, for the vast majority of voters, hard to observe and difficult to interpret correctly. Because of these conditions, it is to be hoped that voters will take into account those personal characteristics related to the chances that a politician will act in a honest and disinterested manner (McCurley and Mondak, 1995). It is nothing more than the basilar Burkean assumption of representative democracy: namely, that of voters looking for "representatives whom [they] can trust" (Mondak, 1995: 1045). At times however, electoral outcomes seem to be at odds with this assumption. In the Italian election of 2008, the coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi won 47 percent of the popular vote despite the fact that its leader was perceived as honest by only 30 percent of the electorate (ITANES, 2008). Similarly, in the U.S. presidential election of 1996, Bill Clinton secured his second term in the White House even though he was perceived as honest by a minority (e.g., 38 percent) of voters (Bartels, 2002: 48).

[1] I would like to thank Pierangelo Isernia for encouraging me to carry out this research, Maurizio Cotta for the useful, thought-provoking remarks on an early draft of this manuscript, and Paolo Bellucci for his time, patience, and precious suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the XXIII Annual SISP Conference (Rome, 17-19 September 2009). I would like to express my gratitude to all the participants for the comments received. Naturally, the author alone remains responsible for any mistakes still present.

The fact that candidates perceived as honest only by a minority are able to gain (at times absolute) majorities implies that a number of voters cast their votes in favor of a candidate they admittedly consider dishonest. Therefore, this study aims to understand the individual-level determinants of the *dishonest vote* – that is, a vote cast in favor of a candidate perceived as dishonest by the voter himself[2]. The implications of such phenomenon appear to be extremely relevant for the quality of representative democracy. In fact, it is our opinion that the practice of the dishonest vote originates a *vicious circle,* in which the election in office of a person widely perceived as dishonest by the electorate determines the de-legitimization of the office itself – a fact that in turn generates less hesitation in voting again for a dishonest candidate for such an office. We know that the principal determinant of mass dissatisfaction with politics lies in the widespread perception of politicians' lack of honesty (Dalton, 2004). Studying the dishonest vote at the micro-level allows us to understand the role of the voters themselves in the growing dissatisfaction with political institutions and their actors – and it is indeed surprising that this phenomenon has been substantially ignored by the previous literature.
In the analysis, we will show the comparatively unimportant role of voters' political/ideological orientations in determining a choice in favor of a dishonest candidate (what we will call the *stand-taking* hypothesis). Rather, it will be demonstrated that the key determinant of the dishonest vote lies in the perception of *every* candidate as dishonest and, more generally, in the belief that politicians are *all the same.* Also, we will demonstrate that the probabilities of casting a dishonest vote are higher among a certain kind of voters – namely, those characterized by a lack of interest in politics and a comparatively lower degree of *civicness.*

This paper is articulated as follows: after a brief sketch of the process of personalization which occurred in Italian politics during the last two decades (Section 2), we will present the relevant literature on psychological determinants of voting behavior (Sections 3 and 4) in order to advance a number of research hypotheses. These will be tested on the Italian case – and more specifically the parliamentary election of 2006 (the relevance of the chosen case is described in Section 5) – at both bivariate (Section 6) and multivariate (Section 7) levels. Finally, the results of the analysis will be discussed along with their major implications (Section 8).

2. The Personalization of Italian Politics

The personalization of politics should be seen as a process in which "the political weight of the individual actor in the political process increases over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e., political party) declines" (Rahat and Sheafer, 2007: 65). Among the various causes of such a process, the literature has concentrated on three in particular (see: McAllister, 2007). The first relates to changes in the institutional setting of a country: the majoritarian electoral reforms that occurred in Italy (as well as in Israel and Japan) in the 1990s and the spread of primary elections around Europe (Hazan 2006) are both good examples of institutional change promoting personalization. The second cause of this process, far more visible, lies in the growing role of television as main (and sometimes only) source of political information for the electorate. Because of its power to present images, it is easier for television to communicate information through physical objects such as leaders – rather than through abstract entities like parties, manifestos or

[2] It should be clarified that the term *dishonest* does not entail any normative judgment on the author's behalf with respect to individual voting behavior. It is rather a stylistic note loosely interchangeable with 'vote *for* dishonest' and that does not imply in any way the existence of a *honest vote* qualitatively better under a normative point of view.

ideologies. In this respect, personalization has been defined as “the more general, pervasive, and fundamental element in the process of change of electoral campaigns” (Swanson and Mancini, 1996). Finally, it has been hypothesized that the personalization of politics is a consequence of the widespread erosion of partisan loyalties encountered in almost every advanced industrial democracy (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000). Given the historically decisive role of partisan alignments in structuring vote choice at the individual level (Campbell *et al.,* 1960), it is reasonable to hypothesize that in times of partisan dealignment, “voters will rely more heavily on the appeal of the personalities of the leaders” (McAllister 2007: 582).

In many respects, the Second Italian Republic (1994) represents the ideal-typical ‘personalized polity’ (Calise, 2004). The collapse of the old *partitocrazia* – weakened by an erosion of the stable social cleavages on which it was based, and further discredited by *Mani Pulite* scandals (Gilbert, 1995) – produced the most appropriate conditions for popular non-political figures to ‘*enter the field*’. Moreover, the majoritarian reform of the electoral systems for both local and national elections “strongly reinforced the view that people would henceforward directly decide on political outcomes” (Calise, 2005: 90). With respect to political communication, it is true that television coverage was already shifting towards the candidates during the 1980s. Yet the entrance of media-tycoon Silvio Berlusconi in Italian politics resulted, according to many, in an unprecedented acceleration of the trend (Campus and Pasquino, 2006). Thanks to the success of his *media party* Forza Italia (Perrucci and Villa, 2004), he made the others become increasingly dependent on television, for it immediately “seemed clear that no party could remain in the contest without heavy use of mass communication channels” (Mazzoleni, 1996: 200). The extent to which Italian electoral campaigns have become more personalized is evident from the adoption of televised election debates *all’Americana* (Campus and Pasquino, 2006). Furthermore, the resilience of Silvio Berlusconi (uncontested leader of the centre-right coalition) and Romano Prodi (Prime Minister twice: in 1996-8 and 2006-8) on the political scene contributed in making the past decade “something of a duel between two leaders” (Cotta and Verzichelli 2007: 64).

Increasing personalization in the ‘supply’ side of Italian politics would lead us to expect a progressive *individualization* (Bellucci and Whiteley, 2006) in voters’ behavior. This is indeed documented by a number of empirical studies. If until the 1970s social characteristics of voters (such as educational level, social class and religious practice) alone could account for up to 80 percent of the variance in vote choice, in 2001 this information helped explain vote choice only in 56 percent of the cases (Catellani and Corbetta, 2006) – a rather unsatisfactory result, given that taking a *wild guess* knowing nothing about the voter brings by definition to a success rate of 50 percent. The analysis of 2001 data have also demonstrated that partisan alignments, historically considered as a major determinant of individual vote choice, played in that year a decidedly weaker role compared to the past (Maraffi, 2002). As said, the decline of social cleavages and partisan alignments led some to hypothesize the growing effect of other objects – such as political leaders’ personality – on individuals’ voting decision. A *prima facie* confirmation of this hypothesis with respect to the Italian case comes from the cross-temporal analysis of Italian National Election Study (ITANES) data. Since 1968, respondents have been repeatedly asked what factor (e.g., candidate, party leader, party/coalition, party manifesto) they mainly looked at in deciding their vote. If in the 1970s the percentage of respondents who looked principally at

the party leader in choosing which party to vote for was below 10 percent (ITANES 1968; 1972), we observe that today this percentage is almost threefold (ITANES 2006; 2008). A number of empirical studies further corroborates the validity of the personalization hypothesis with regard to individuals' vote behavior (see, for example: Venturino, 2000). Very instructive in this respect is the analysis by Sani (2002): as he finds out, voters' evaluation of coalition leaders (e.g., sympathy score on a 1-to-10 scale) emerges as the most influential statistical predictor of vote choice in the election of 2001, outperforming in the model even left-right orientations and retrospective evaluations of governmental activity.

3. New Determinants of Vote Choice (I) – The Leaders' Personality

3.1. The Preeminent Role of Honesty

According to Jean Blondel, "[i]f leaders make an impact on their societies, common sense concludes that this must be due, in very large part, to their personal qualities" (Blondel, 1987: 115). The question is: what qualities are we talking about? The early literature – as carefully reviewed by Bass (1981) – found more than forty personal (e.g., physical and psychological) characteristics associated in one way or another with leadership. Similarly, a recent volume edited by Anthony King moves from the consideration that twenty-six different attributes might have in principle a bearing on voting decision (King 2002: 9). Beginning in the 1960s, an important stream of empirical research has began investigating which of these characteristics is most important for an *ideal president.* According to the data collected by Sigel (1964), around 80 percent of the American electorate considered honesty to be the most essential characteristic for a president. Two decades later, a group of American scholars demonstrated that, in the eyes of voters, a *presidential prototype* should be first and foremost honest – this answer being provided by more than 90 percent of the respondents (Kinder *et al.,* 1980). Similar data is presented in the more recent literature dealing with established parliamentary democracies, such as Australia (McAllister, 2000), Germany (Brettschneider and Gabriel, 2002), and Italy (Barisione, 2006). In the light of what has been said so far, it appears that honesty plays (from a normative point of view) a preeminent role in the way voters evaluate political leaders – yesterday like today, in the U.S. as in Europe. At any rate, the fact that presidential prototypes in voters' mind are honest people does not automatically imply that candidates perceived as honest *gain votes* at the expenses of less honest ones. In this respect, a consistent number of studies have concentrated on the effect of leaders' personality traits on individuals' voting behavior. Although varied in magnitude, the electoral effect of honesty is always positive, in both presidential (Miller and Shanks, 1996) and parliamentary (Bean 1993; Ohr and Oscarsson, 2003) elections. It must be noted that the importance of honesty in candidate evaluations depends heavily on the context in which this evaluation takes place. If in Anglo-Saxon and North-European contexts candidates' honesty is taken somehow for granted, this is not equally true with respect to a country like Italy – where politicians' honesty should indeed have an even more salient role. In virtue of the preceding discussion that stressed the preeminent role of candidates' honesty on individual voting choice, we can advance that:

Hypothesis 1 – Voting for a candidate perceived as dishonest depends principally upon the fact that the feature of honesty is not found in any of the candidates («*In the end, they are all dishonest…*»)[3].

[3] Another plausible hypothesis is that voters, not perceiving the trait of honesty in either of the competing candidates, opt for abstention. However, the literature shows that the correlation between distrust in politicians and turnout is rather low – and at any rate null with respect to the Italian case (Dalton, 2004). Furthermore our data seem to falsify such hypothesis quite clearly (see: footnote 9).

3.2. The 'Overall Image' of the Leader

According to the previous sub-section, it seems evident that honesty is a fundamental requisite for a political candidate, at both the normative and empirical levels. However, the preeminent role of honesty *vis-à-vis* any other single characteristic does not exclude the plausibility of a somewhat competing hypothesis. That is, voters (possibly those who consider honesty as essential) may still prefer a dishonest candidate on the grounds that they like him or her more than the other *altogether*. Some historical examples are enlightening in this respect. Despite the primacy of honesty among the personal attributes most desired by voters, the U.S. presidential election of 1972 were not won by George McGovern – whose image was precisely characterized by the trait of moral integrity. Instead, the victory went to Richard Nixon, who appeared more competent and *presidentiable* on the whole to voters (Rokeach, 1973). Similarly, the Italian election of 2001 was fought essentially around the *persona* of the coalition leaders: Francesco Rutelli (the honest candidate) and Silvio Berlusconi (the strong candidate). Although also Italian voters considered honesty as the ideal characteristic of a political leader (Barisione, 2006), it was the perceived less honest candidate who won the election[4] – a victory explained by some through the need for a 'strong leader' for the country in the mind of wide sectors of the electorate (Cartocci and Corbetta, 2001).

As said earlier, there exists a significant (and potentially infinite) number of aspects of a candidate's personality on which voters can base a global evaluation. However, empirical analyses have shown that voters develop a mental image of political leaders *as persons* on the basis of a restricted number of categories: *competence, charisma* (or *leadership*), *integrity* (or *honesty*), and *empathy* (Miller and Miller, 1976; Kinder *et al.*, 1979; Miller *et al.*, 1986). Kinder *et al.* (1979) demonstrate that the presence/absence of each of these characteristics in politicians' personality, as perceived by voters, contributes in a substantially uniform manner to their overall evaluation (on the 1-to-10 scale). In other words, a positive judgment of such candidate – a nice '9' for example – depends on (perceived) honesty as much as on (perceived) competence. Indeed, following studies have demonstrated how, according to the different contexts, candidates' global evaluations are shaped more strongly by performance-related factors such as competence (Pancer *et al.,* 1999) or leadership strength (Funk, 1999; Ohr and Oscarsson, 2003). Therefore, findings reported by these studies caution us from overestimating the electoral effect of honesty. In fact, this might represent the *single* most important quality for a candidate; yet this does not exclude that the sum of singularly less relevant factors might weight more in the evaluation of the (comparatively better) leader. We can hence substantiate the points raised here into an alternative hypothesis to the previous one, that is:

Hypothesis 2 – Voting for a candidate not perceived as honest depends on a comparative overall evaluation of the competing candidates' personality («*He might be dishonest, but he is still better than the other…*»).

3.3. The Conditionality of Leaders' Personality Effects

Obviously, leaders' personality does not matter to the same degree for all voters. Previous studies have shown that it matters more to some than to others. Unfortunately, such studies have not found any sort of agreement with respect to who are the former and who are the latter. Some (Glass, 1985; Miller *et al.*, 1986) advanced that the impact of leaders' personality is directly proportional to the level of political sophistication of those who evaluate it.

[4] A survey conducted by ITANES before that election shows that the winner, Silvio Berlusconi, was perceived as honest by 36 percent of the electorate, while his opponent was considered a honest person by slightly less than 50 percent.

Following their reasoning, a higher interest in political matters corresponds to a larger amount of available information – and therefore a bigger influence of the latter on vote choice. Being contemporary political communication strongly centered on the *persona* of politicians, it should go without saying that the more one is interested in politics, the higher the probability to be exposed to information related to the personality of politicians. A radically different argumentation is provided by Pierce (1993), who advances that "more politically sophisticated individuals should be *less* likely to rely on candidate traits in forming their candidate preferences…Candidate traits need not be related to politics, whereas parties, ideologies, and issues are inherently political; thus, candidate traits require less sophistication to understand and incorporate into the voting decision" (24). This with respect to the leaders' personality with no further specification. What can we say about the specific trait of honesty? Is it more important to some than to others? One school of thought on the matter contends that the ideal president should be honest *especially* in the eyes of less politically sophisticated (Kinder *et al.,* 1980; Funk, 1996). The other claims that those who are more informed are also more conscious of the civic norms connected to candidate evaluation, and hence more likely to give a relevant weight to honesty in their overall evaluation of a politician (Wilson and Banfield, 1964; 1971). Given the clear divergences in the previous literature, it is extremely difficult to hypothesize about the role that political sophistication plays in voting for a candidate who is perceived as dishonest. In any case, the following sections will attempt to clarify which of these research paths adapt better to the Italian case.

4. New Determinants of Vote Choice (II) – The Voters' Personality

When talking about the personalization of politics, reference is commonly made to the particular importance taken on by *politicians*' personal characteristics in orienting voters' preferences. However, a growing number of studies points out that also *voters'* individual characteristics has increased in importance with respect to their political choices (for a review, see: Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004). In their pioneer study of the civic culture in five nations, Almond and Verba (1963) advanced (although not testing it empirically) the hypothesis that masses and political elites in a nation share the same kind of political attitudes and culture (a culture that the authors explain to be potentially more or less *civic*). This mechanism of *congruency* is well explained at the micro-level by personality psychology. According to Caprara and Zimbardo (2004), "[w]e want to trust competent leaders, but we also want to like them personally, and this is easier when they are perceived as essentially similar to us" (590). In a study of 2007 on two samples of Italian and American voters, Caprara *et al.* (2007) demonstrate that the more that voters perceive candidates as similar to themselves, the higher the chances are that they will vote for these candidates – as if they are saying *the more you are like me, the more I can trust you*.

Returning to honesty, we should draw attention to the fact that it does not simply consist of the *tendency to do what is honest* (Hursthouse, 2009). Honesty is, first and foremost, a character trait — that is, a principle that guides a person's attitudes and actions in every aspect of his life (Matthews *et al.,* 2003). An honest person's reasons and choices with respect to honest and dishonest actions reflect his views about honesty — but of course such views manifest themselves with respect to other actions. Moving from the psychological assumption that personality traits directly influence behavior (*ibid.*), one could argue that a person who values honesty will choose to work with honest people, to have honest friends and – when at the polling station –

to vote for a candidate (s)he believes to be honest. Conversely, if one attempts to infer the electoral behavior of an individual from his *lack* of honesty, it is not too hard to imagine that this person will be less sensitive than others (or even *more* sensitive?) to a candidate's dishonesty. The question is: how can we *measure* voters' honesty? A widely used indicator in social sciences seems to fit fairly well with our purposes: the degree of a citizen's civic morality (or *civicness*). Civic morality represents "honesty in the context of the public good" (Letki, 2006: 306), and it refers to the sense of civic responsibility for such public good. It entails obedience to the rules, and it is thus a prerequisite of honest and compliant behavior (Orviska and Hudson, 2002). Based on this, we advance our final research hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3 – The propensity to vote for a candidate perceived as dishonest is higher among those voters characterized by a comparatively lower degree of *civicness.*

5. Data and Measures

Our research hypotheses will be tested through a case study of the 2006 Italian parliamentary election. The Italian case has been chosen for the prominent role exerted by party (coalition) leaders in the political competition. If political leaders' personality is to be found as electorally relevant also in parliamentary system, the place to look at is definitely the Second Italian Republic (see Section 2 above). Furthermore, the election of 2006 was the first election held under the current electoral system (for a better discussion, see: Renwick *et al.*, 2009). For our purposes, it is important to underline three key features of the new system: *i)* the law allows – and somehow encourages, through the 'majority bonus' mechanism – the formation of pre-electoral coalitions, whose candidate to the premiership has to be formalized in advance; *ii)* every vote for a party automatically implies a vote in favor of the coalition to which this party belongs; *iii)* the winner *takes it all* – that is, the coalition reaching the (relative) majority of votes is awarded 55 percent of the seats. In other words, in 2006, Italians were not called to elect their representatives in parliament (in fact, the law replaced the single-member constituencies in use since 1993 with regional macro-constituencies and closed party lists), but rather a coalition of parties supporting a candidate to the premiership. The *pseudo-presidential* course of the electoral competition was further strengthened by a number of factors, such as the unprecedented lack of relevant third forces, while the two leaders' debates helped accentuate the widespread perception of that election as a *duel* between two leaders (Cotta and Verzichelli, 2007).

Data comes from an ITANES[5] post-electoral survey conducted between April and June 2006 (nationally representative multistage sample conducted through face-to-face interviews/CAPI; n=1377). The dependent variable is computed as follows. Based on the above discussion, we attribute to coalition leaders each vote cast for parties in their respective coalitions. With respect to leaders' perceived honesty, we rely on a survey question asking the respondents whether they consider the competing coalition leaders as honest persons (yes/no question). Our dependent variable is thus a *dummy*, with a value of '0' assigned to every respondent declaring to have voted for (the coalition of) a leader perceived as honest, and a value of '1' to those who did not explicitly perceive the trait of honesty in the (coalition's) leader they voted for – that is, the *dishonest vote*[6]. It seems worth mentioning the differences in

[5] ITANES (Italian National Election Studies) is a research program conceived and promoted by the Istituto Cattaneo, Bologna, Italy, and funded by the Ministry of Education, University and Research. Further information about the ITANES program is available at http://www.itanes.it/. The analyses, interpretations, and conclusions in this paper are solely those of the author.

[6] 307 respondents did not declare who they voted for, hence the analysis will be performed on the remaining 1070 cases.

perceived honesty with respect to each leader. Romano Prodi is considered honest by 63 percent of respondents (82 percent among the Unione voters), while Silvio Berlusconi's honesty is perceived by only 27 percent of respondents (56 percent among CdL voters). For what concerns the group of voters who casted a dishonest vote, we observe that: (a) they represent a significant part of the sample (29 percent); (b) roughly two thirds of this group are centre-right voters; but (c) the dishonest vote is present, in a comparatively smaller yet not negligible proportion, on the centre-left side of the spectrum.

Twelve explanatory variables will be included in the following analyses:

1. *socio-demographic characteristics* of the respondents (age, gender, educational level, profession);
2. *other candidate's honesty:* our first research hypothesis postulates that the dishonest vote is due to the perception of both candidates as dishonest persons; therefore, we will include in the analysis this dichotomous variable scoring '1' those who considered the candidate they did not vote for to be honest, and '0' all others (a wide majority: 81 percent of the sample);
3. *leaders' differential:* our second hypothesis moves from the idea that it is not honesty *per se* that matters in voters' choice; rather, what matters is a comparative overall evaluation of the candidates. ITANES respondents were asked to evaluate a number of political leaders (including Silvio Berlusconi and Romano Prodi) *'giving a mark between 1 and 10: 1 meaning completely negative judgment, 10 completely positive judgment and 6 sufficiently positive'*. We compute the differential in leaders' evaluation through the difference between the score assigned to the candidate voted on and the score assigned to the other (positive values indicate a better evaluation of the candidate voted on, and *vice versa*);
4. *left-right self-placement:* through the inclusion of this variable we can assess our hypotheses against a *social-psychological* model of voting behavior (Campbell *et al.,* 1960), that postulates voters' choices as a reflection of long-term political affiliations[7]. Indeed, some might object that the dishonest vote is nothing more than a consequence of the voter's pre-existing political orientation as confronted with a bi-polar setting; the choice to vote for a dishonest candidate would thus be due to the simple fact that he is the voter's *only* candidate. For this reason, we include in our analysis the respondents' self-placement on the left-right axis (1-to-10 scale). Its inclusion will allow us to assess the explanatory power of leader-related variables *net* of the *stand-taking* effect (that is, *'I vote right [left] wing because I am right [left] wing*');
5. *interest in politics:* as said, one of the aims of this research is to understand whether more (or less?) politically sophisticated voters are more sensitive to candidates' honesty. We use the respondents' level of interest in political matters as a proxy of political sophistication [frequency distribution: *not at all,* 16 percent; *not much,* 44 percent; *fairly much,* 37 percent; *very much,* 6 percent];
6. *items on civicness:* ITANES questionnaire included a battery of four items related to civicness; respondents were asked to judge on a scale from 0 (never) to 10 (always) how justifiable they considered the following actions: *i)* to not pay the ticket on a public

[7] The key variable of this model, as developed in the American context, is *party identification* (Campbell *et al.,* 1960). In this study, we opted for voters' *left-right placement* for it "seems to provide an even *more* important political cue for West European publics than the liberal-conservative continuum does for Americans" (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976: 243).

transportation; *ii)* to evade taxes; *iii)* to try to obtain benefits from the State even though there is no entitlement to them ; *iv)* to accept dark money (bribes)[8]. In order to facilitate the analysis, we have collapsed the respondents' scores on the four variables in three simple categories (see: Norris, 1999), assigning a score of '1' to those who consider the behavior in discussion *never justifiable,* '3' to those who consider it *always justifiable,* and '2' to those who responded *according to the circumstances.* Table 1 presents the percentage distributions in our sample with respect to the four variables on civicness, controlled for vote (coalition) choice. The major divergences between CdL (centre-right) and Unione (centre-left) voters are to be found in their attitudes towards tax evasion and undue acceptance of State benefits (with centre-left voters comparatively less prone to justify both behaviors), while no difference is observed in the two groups' attitudes towards the *extreme* items (e.g., cheating on a public transportation's ticket and accepting bribes, respectively)[9].

Table 1 – Justifiability of uncivic behaviors and coalition vote
(% of respondents considering the various behaviors as...)

	Bus Ticket		***Tax Evasion***		***Benefits from the State***		***Bribes***	
	CdL	**UN**	**CdL**	**UN**	**CdL**	**UN**	**CdL**	**UN**
Never Justifiable	61,6% (287)	60,4% (364)	58,2% (270)	70,9% (428)	65,2% (303)	73,8% (446)	79,6% (371)	82,6% (499)
According to the Circumstances	37,6% (175)	38,8% (234)	40,9% (190)	29,1% (176)	34,2% (159)	26,2% (158)	20,2% (94)	17,4% (105)
Always Justifiable	0,9% (4)	0,8% (5)	0,9% (4)	0,0% (0)	0,6% (3)	0,0% (0)	0,2% (1)	0,0% (0)
	100% (466)	100% (603)	100% (466)	100% (603)	100% (466)	100% (603)	100% (466)	100% (603)

6. Bivariate Analysis

In this section, we will shed some light on the relationship between our dependent variable (e.g., the dishonest vote) and the main explanatory variables. In the previous section, we mentioned the possibility that the dishonest vote is nothing more than a reflection of voters' pre-existing political orientations (that is, our *stand-taking* hypothesis). If this was the case, then we

[8] It must be noted that an opinion regarding the justifiability of others' uncivic behaviors does not represent proof of the respondent's lack of civicness. We find it difficult, however, to imagine a citizen characterized by a flawless civic morality being willing to justify at the same time others' lack of civicness. From a more empirical point of view, we also know of the strong correlation between the *attitudinal* and the *behavioral* dimensions of civic morality (Song and Yarbrough, 1979).

[9] For what concerns the abstainers (6,4% in the sample), we observe a generalized skepticism with respect to the candidates' honesty (Berlusconi and Prodi are considered honest by 16 and 47 percent of this group, respectively). At the same time, this group is also characterized by much lower levels of civicness and interest in political matters (two out of three declare to be *not interested at all*).

would find the highest proportion of dishonest votes among voters favorably oriented to the coalition led by the *less* honest leader (in our case, centre-right voters). This argumentation yields substantial support in the data, with a bigger proportion of votes cast for a dishonest candidate among voters from the right (33 percent) and centre-right (42 percent), as compared to those placed on the left (14 percent) and centre-left (18 percent). The relationship between these two variables is moderate in magnitude ($r = .22$) and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), while the coefficient's sign points in the expected direction (to a rightists political orientation corresponds a higher probability to vote for a dishonest candidate). Is this enough to demonstrate our *stand-taking* hypothesis? The answer is negative, for two reasons. First, because the main weakness of bivariate analysis lies in its inability to detect whether the observed relationship is *spurious* (that is, whether the correlation between variables is due to a third variable external to the relation). Second, because things get more complicated by the percentage of dishonest votes among voters placed on the centre of the political spectrum: 52 percent. In other words, the relationship we are observing is not linear: (centre-)right voters are more likely to vote for a dishonest candidate than are (centre-)left voters, but both are *less* likely to cast a dishonest vote as compared with voters placed in the centre. For these reasons, we must wait for the multivariate analysis in order to safely confirm (or reject) the *stand-taking* hypothesis.

Contrary to the relationship with voters' left-right orientation, the relationship between dishonest vote and interest in politics reveals a rather linear development. The percentage of respondents declaring to have voted for a dishonest candidate among those not interested at all in politics hits 40 percent, diminishing progressively with the growth of interest in political matters (30 percent among the *not much,* 26 percent among the *fairly*, and 13 percent among the *very much* interested). Pearson's correlation coefficient between the two variables is weak in magnitude ($r = -.12$) but statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). Although the correlational nature of the analysis does not allow us to establish a causal link between (dis)interest in politics and a dishonest vote, we can nonetheless observe that if candidates' honesty matters, it matters the most for those more interested in political matters.

What can we say about the relationship with leader-related variables? The hypothesis stating that the dishonest vote is due to the perception of *every* candidate as dishonest (Hypothesis 1) fits quite well with the data. With respect to the group of respondents who declare to have voted for a candidate not perceived as honest, the wide majority (78 percent) is represented by voters who considered *neither* of the candidates to be honest people. The second hypothesis was indeed that the *dishonest vote* is due to a comparative overall evaluation of the candidates. As said, this represents a rival hypothesis to the first, as it moves from the assumption that honesty counts only to a certain extent – what really matters is the overall image of the candidates. If this hypothesis is correct, then to a higher gap in candidates' evaluation should correspond an increased likelihood to vote for one who is considered dishonest ('*he might be dishonest, but he is still better than the other…*'). However, the data clearly seem to falsify this hypothesis. The higher proportion of dishonest votes is to be found among those who assigned a lower score to the candidate voted for, as compared to his rival ('Inverse preference' category in Figure 1). Then, this proportion diminishes progressively with the growth of the evaluation-gap in favor of the candidate voted for. Against our expectation then, the bivariate analysis shows that voters do *not* vote for a dishonest

candidate because they like him better than the other. Quite to the contrary, the probability of casting a dishonest vote increases proportionally with the perception that *'in the end, they are all the same'.* We will return to this point when discussing the results from the multivariate analysis. For now, we limit ourselves to the observation that the first hypothesis *seems* valid at the expense of the second – that is to say: *it is honesty that matters.*

Figure 1 – *Dishonest vote* and comparative leaders' evaluation
(% of dishonest votes controlled for candidates' evaluation gap)



Note: Inverse Preference: **respondent assigns a lower score on the candidate voted for as compared to his rival;** ***Equivalence:*** **same score for candidate voted for and his rival;** ***Weak Preference:*** **1-to-3 point gap in favor of the candidate voted for;** ***Strong Preference:*** **4-to-6 point gap;** ***Very Strong Preference:*** **7-to-9 point gap.**

Finally, our research hypothesized that the propensity to vote for a dishonest candidate is higher among those voters characterized by a comparatively lower degree of civicness (Hypothesis 3). Table 2 traces the relationship between dishonest vote and the four items on civism. We note that, in proportion, those who voted for a candidate they consider honest are also those who regarded the various uncivic behaviors as *less* justifiable. Let us concentrate for a moment on the first row of the table, that is, the percentage of respondents considering the aforementioned behaviors to be *never justifiable.* It can be appreciated that this percentage is constantly lower among those who casted a dishonest vote. However, the magnitude of such differences is highly variable: while for the extreme items (e.g., not to pay the ticket on a public transportation and accepting bribes, respectively) the deviations are quite small, we note stronger divergences among the two groups with respect to their attitude towards tax evasion (12 percentage points) and undue acceptance of benefits from the State (8.5 percent). The data seem to testify in favor of our third research hypothesis: according to these results, it is precisely the less civic voters who show a higher propensity to the dishonest vote.

Table 2 – Justifiability of uncivic behaviors and *dishonest vote*
(% of respondents considering the various behaviors as...)

	Bus Ticket		***Tax Evasion***		***Benefits from the State***		***Bribes***	
	Dishonest Vote	**Others**	**Dishonest Vote**	**Others**	**Dishonest Vote**	**Others**	**Dishonest Vote**	**Others**
Never Justifiable	59,7% (185)	61,4 % (466)	57,0% (176)	68,8 % (523)	64,1% (198)	72,6 (551)	79,4% (246)	82,1 % (624)
According to Circumstances	39,7% (123)	37,7 % (286)	42,4% (131)	30,9 % (235)	35,3% (109)	27,3 % (207)	20,6% (64)	17,7 % (135)
Always Justifiable	0,6% (2)	0,9% (7)	0,6% (2)	0,3% (2)	0,6% (2)	0,1% (1)	0,0% (0)	0,1% (1)
	100% (310)	100% (759)	100% (309)	100% (760)	100% (309)	100% (759)	100% (310)	100% (760)

However, for a careful reader, the strong similarity between the relationships presented respectively in Table 1 (civicness by coalition vote) and Table 2 (civicness by dishonest vote) will not go unnoticed. It would seem that the inclination of less civics to vote for a dishonest candidate is proportionally equivalent to that of centre-right voters to vote for a dishonest candidate. We then ask: is there perhaps a correlation between political orientation and respondents' degree of civic morality? Although previous studies on the Italian case reported an 'almost non-existent' correlation among these variables (Ricolfi, 2002), our data speaks in favor of the existence of such relationship. The correlation matrix presented in Table 3 shows that individuals' political orientation is indeed correlated in statistically significant terms ($p < 0.01$) with the two most discriminating items (e.g., 'Tax evasion' and 'Benefits from the State'). However, the magnitude of the relationship looks too weak (Pearson's *r* coefficient equal to .14 and .10 respectively) to advance that political orientations and civicness work as proxies. The weak intercorrelation among these items makes the inclusion of both predictors in the multivariate analysis safe from problems of multicollinearity.

Table 3 [10]**-** Pearson's *r* correlation matrix: items on civism and left-right orientation

	L/R	*Civ1*	*Civ2*	*Civ3*	*Civ4*
L/R	1				
Civ1	-.004	1			
Civ2	**.141**	**.498**	1		
Civ3	**.099**	**.440**	**.498**	1	
Civ4	.050	**.392**	**.453**	**.507**	1

Note: coefficients in **bold** are statistically significant at the .01 level (two-tailed).
Civ1: Bus Ticket; *Civ2:* Tax Evasion; *Civ3:* Benefits from the State; *Civ4:* Bribes.

[10] A correlation matrix extended to all variables included in the analysis shows that the stronger intercorrelation is to be found among the four items on civism, followed by the relation between left-right self-placement and perceived honesty of the non-voted candidate ($r = .32$).

7. Multivariate Analysis

In the previous section, we analyzed the relationship between the dependent variable and the main predictors. In this section, we will assess the explanatory power of each variable *controlling for the effect of all others,* through hierarchical logistic regression. In Table 4 are presented the standardized (hence comparable in magnitude) regression coefficients related to the five different *steps* of regression analysis.

Table 4 – Hierarchical Logistic Regression Estimates (standardized coefficients)

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Gender	-0,026 (0,149)	-0,026 (0,153)	0,022 (0,163)	-0,066 (0,169)	-0,076 (0,170)
Age	-0,011 ** (0,005)	-0,011 ** (0,005)	-0,013 ** (0,006)	-0,011 * (0,006)	-0,012 ** (0,006)
Educational Level	-0,009 (0,095)	0,012 (0,098)	0,012 (0,105)	0,074 (0,109)	0,075 (0,109)
Profession[i]					
Unemployed	-0,343 (0,218)	-0,193 (0,226)	-0,247 (0,240)	-0,269 (0,242)	-0,177 (0,247)
Private Sector	-0,433 * (0,237)	-0,269 (0,245)	-0,373 (0,257)	-0,450 * (0,260)	-0,349 (0,265)
Public Sector	-0,037 (0,258)	0,191 (0,268)	0,038 (0,283)	0,026 (0,284)	0,128 (0,289)
Left-Right Self-Placement	-	0,181 *** (0,027)	0,246 *** (0,033)	0,243 *** (0,033)	0,235 *** (0,033)
Other Candidate's Honesty	-	-	-0,558 *** (0,205)	-0,553 *** (0,205)	-0,542 *** (0,206)
Leaders' Differential	-	-	-0,282 *** (0,030)	-0,275 *** (0,030)	-0,274 *** (0,030)
Interest in Politics	-	-	-	-0,243 ** (0,110)	-0,229 ** (0,111)
Items on Civism[ii]					
Bus Ticket	-	-	-	-	0,070 (0,097)
Tax Evasion	-	-	-	-	0,272 ** (0,108)
Benefits from the State	-	-	-	-	0,215 * (0,130)
Constant	-0,109 (0,481)	-1,278 (0,523)	-0,271 (0,575)	0,189 (0,613)	0,116 (0,617)
□²	12,273	57,913	160,690	165,864	173,560
□	.056	.000	.000	.000	.000
Pseudo-R² (Nagelkerke)	**0,018**	**0,082**	**0,217**	**0,223**	**0,233**

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard error in parenthesis.

[i] Reference category: *Self-employed* (coefficients not shown).

[ii] Variables centered on the average score of single respondents on the four indicators. Reference category: *Bribes* (coefficients not shown).

Following the methodological assumptions of hierarchical multiple regression analysis, we enter variables in the model in an order determined by the proximity/distance between the *explanandum* and the *explanans.* We begin with Model 1, which consists in the respondents' socio-demographic characteristics alone. Despite its trifling explanatory power (as measured by the coefficient of multiple determination), the model signals the presence of a statistically significant effect of the age variable. The regression coefficient is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) and negatively signed – that is, the probabilities to cast a dishonest vote are inversely proportional to the voter's age. In Model 2 is added the respondents' self-placement on the left-right scale (10-point scale where '1' is left and '10' is right). The coefficient is significant and signed as expected, but the overall explanatory power of the model does not seem to increase enough to accept the social-psychological interpretation of voting behaviour for the case at hand.

A much better statistical explanation is provided by candidate-related variables – which we include in the third block. The inclusion of the two variables (e.g., 'Other candidate's honesty', and 'Leaders' differential') in Model 3 leads the model to a threefold increase in terms of explanatory power. The finding is of absolute relevance, for it represents a confirmation of the preeminent role of candidates' images in shaping vote choices as compared to previous political orientations. Consistently with our first hypothesis, perceived dishonesty of the 'other' candidate is a strong and statistically significant determinant of the dishonest vote – as testified by the negative sign of the coefficient. It would thus seem that voting on a dishonest candidate depends heavily on the perception of every candidate as dishonest. With regard to our second hypothesis, the coefficient relative to the 'leader differential' variable is also statistically significant. However the negative sign falsifies it once and for all, confirming that the chances to cast a dishonest vote increase proportionally to the perception that there is no better candidate than the one voted for.

In Model 4 and 5 are added the respondents' level of political interest and the various items on civism. The inclusion of these variables does not increase the explanatory power of the model, but it contributes in statistically significant manner to the explanation of *who* is more likely to cast a dishonest vote – in our case, those voters characterized by a comparatively lower degree of civic morality and interest in political matters.

Yet, the 'strong' finding of this analysis is another, and it pertains to the role of honesty. Casting a dishonest vote is in fact due, first and foremost, by the lack of (perceived) honesty in *every* candidate, and more generally to the perception that politicians are *all the same*.

8. Discussion and Conclusions

We believe that the data presented so far represent a substantial contribution to a number of debates in electoral psychology. The first point of interest relates to the role of politicians' personality in individual vote choice. Our analysis should have demonstrated that voting for a dishonest candidate depends only marginally on the voter's social characteristics and pre-existing political orientations. It is indeed surprising to observe how the *stand-taking* hypothesis gets downsized by our analysis. As said, being placed on the right side of the political spectrum increases the likelihood of casting a dishonest vote – a rather banal conclusion, in the light of the wide gap in terms of perceived honesty among the two coalition leaders in 2006. Nevertheless, our

data demonstrates that the dishonest vote is explained much better by the voters' evaluations of political leaders' personality (see coefficients of multiple determination, Models 2 and 3). In particular, the dishonest vote appears to be determined by two beliefs: that neither of the candidates is a honest person and/or that both are also alike on the whole ('*in the end, they are all the same…*').

This conclusion leads us to another key point of our discussion, connected to the relationship between voting behavior and (dis)trust in democratic representative institutions. So far, it has been ascertained that trust in politicians is in decline in almost every advanced industrial democracy (Norris, 1999: Dalton, 1999; 2004). According to some, the explanation should lay in the widespread *value change* occurring among younger generations (Inglehart, 1977), in the light of which the traditional deference toward authorities is being progressively replaced with feelings of generalized skepticism (Dalton, 1999). The results of our analysis confirm once more the hypothesis that the younger generations are also more disillusioned with politics: in fact, the probabilities of casting a dishonest vote are inversely proportional to the voter's age. Once again, a quite unsurprising conclusion, given that around 80 percent of young Italians declare to perceive *all* politicians as dishonest and corrupt (Falcone, 2006). What is the most surprising is indeed their propensity to participate in the electoral process anyway (9 young out of ten declare to have voted in the Italian election of 2006: *ibid.*). Therefore, it would seem that cynicism is not correlated to the quantitative dimension of voting (that is, the choice to turnout), but rather with its *quality* – that is to say, the tendency to cast a vote for a candidate *despite* the fact that he is openly perceived as dishonest. In Section 1 we have discussed the *vicious circle* triggered by the dishonest vote, arguing that the election in office of a candidate perceived as dishonest by a wide majority of the electorate determines the de-legitimization of the office itself – this engendering in turn less hesitation in voting again for a dishonest candidate for such an office. To this mechanism, at once cause *and* consequence of public distrust in politicians, cynicism contributes by pushing more disillusioned voters away from politics. However, they do not just *quit* the electoral process; instead they tend to lose interest in political matters *between* election times. Unfortunately, being (the lack of) political interest one of the strongest determinants of the dishonest vote, distrust in politicians contributes in this way to produce nothing more than further distrust.

A final point with respect to honesty itself. Our analysis supports once more the conception of personalization of politics as an increasing *congruence* between the personality of voters and that of politicians (Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004). Although there is nothing wrong with this in principle, there is a substantial risk in this mechanism: namely, that politicians might use it in order to leverage on the less noble attitudes of certain segments of the electorate, legitimizing them in a way. According to our data, it emerges quite clearly that the propensity to cast a dishonest vote is much higher among those voters who score lower on civic morality. The real danger of the dishonest vote would thus lay not only in the de-legitimization of the office to which the dishonest is elected, but also (above all?) in the resulting legitimization of dishonest behavior in the eyes of the mass public.

A public that however, and after all, seems to keep candidates' honesty in high esteem. We have seen that the number of voters deciding to cast a vote on a candidate which they perceive as dishonest is, although sizeable, still a minority. Furthermore, our analysis has demonstrated that the key determinant

of the dishonest vote (that explains it better than all other aspect we have considered taken together) is the lack of honesty on the behalf of *every* available candidate. It is a quite reassuring conclusion, that testifies implicitly of the electorate’s willingness to put the vicious circle of distrust to an end. It is now up to party headquarters to lend an ear – and act accordingly.

References List

Almond, G., & Verba, S. 1963. *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations,* Newbury Park, Sage Publication.

Barisione, M. 2006. *L'immagine del leader. Quanto conta per gli elettori?,* Bologna, Il Mulino.

Bartels, L. 2002. *The Impact of Candidate Traits in American Presidential Elections*, in King (2002), pp. 44-69.

Bass, B. 1981. *Stogdill's Handbook on Leadership,* New York, Free Press.

Bean, C. 1993. *The Electoral Influence of Party Leader Images in Australia and New Zealand,* in «Comparative Political Studies», vol. 26, pp. 111-32.

Bellucci, P., & Whiteley, P. 2006. *Modeling Electoral Choice in Europe in the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction*, in «Electoral Studies», vol. 25, pp. 419-423.

Blondel, J. 1987. *Political Leadership. Towards a General Analysis*, London, Sage.

Brettschneider, F., & Gabriel, O. 2002. *The Nonpersonalization of Voting Behaviour in Germany*, in King (2002), pp. 127-157.

Calise, M. 2004. *Un decennio presidenziale*, in «Comunicazione Politica», vol. 5, pp. 25-36.

Calise, M. 2005. *Presidentialization. Italian Style,* in Poguntke & Webb (2005), pp. 88-106.

Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W., & Stokes, D. 1960. *The American Voter,* Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press.

Campus, D., & Pasquino, G. 2006. *Leadership in Italy: The Changing Role of Leaders in Elections and in Government*, in «Journal of Contemporary European Studies», vol. 14, pp. 25-40.

Caprara, G. V., & Zimbardo, P. 2004. *Personalizing politics*, in «American Psychologist», vol. 59, pp. 581-594.

Caprara, G. V., Vecchione, M., Barbaranelli, C., & Fraley, C. 2007. *When Likeness Goes with Liking: The Case of Political Preference*, in «Political Psychology», vol. 28, pp. 609-632.

Cartocci, R., & Corbetta, P. 2001. *Ventenni contro, in* «Il Mulino», vol. 5, pp. 861-870.

Catellani, P., & Corbetta, P. 2006. *Introduzione*, in *Sinistra e destra. Le radici psicologiche della differenza politica,* edited by ITANES, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 7-18.

Clarke, H., Sanders, C., Stewart, M., & Whitley, P. 2004. *Political Choice in Britain*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Cotta, M., & Verzichelli, L. 2007. *Political Institutions in Italy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Dalton, R. 1999. *Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies,* in Norris (1999), pp. 57-77.

Dalton, R. 2004. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices,* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Dalton, R., & Wattenberg, M. 2000. *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Falcone, M. I. 2006. *Il rapporto tra giovani e politica: elementi per un'analisi sociologica a livello europeo,* in «ISIG Quarterly of International Sociology», vol. 15, pp. 1-12.

Franklin, M., Mackie, T., & Valen, H. 1992. *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal. Structures in Western Countries*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Funk, C. 1996. *The Impact of Scandal on Candidate Evaluations: An Experimental Test of the Role of Candidate Traits,* in «Political Behavior», vol. 18, pp. 1-24.

Funk, C. 1999. *Bringing the candidate into models of candidate evaluation*, in «The Journal of Politics», vol. 61, pp. 700–720.
Gilbert, M. 1995. *The Italian Revolution: The End of Politics, Italian Style?* Boudler, Westview Press.
Glass, D. 1985. *Evaluating Presidential Candidates: Who Focuses on Their Personal Attributes?,* in «Public Opinion Quarterly», vol. 49, pp. 517-534.
Hazan, R. 2006. *Metodi di Selezione dei Candidati: le Conseguenze delle Elezioni Interne ai Partiti,* in *Partiti e Sistemi di Partito,* edited by L. Bardi, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 171-196.
Hursthouse, R. 2009. *Virtue Ethics*, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* edited by E. Zalta, Stanford, Stanford University.
Inglehart, R. 1977. *The Silent Revolution*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R., & Klingemann, H. 1976. *Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left-Right Dimensions among Western Mass Publics*, in *Party Identification and Beyond*, edited by I. Budge, I. Crewe & D. Farlie, Hoboken, John Wiley and Sons, pp. 243-273.
Kinder, D., Abelson, R., & Fiske, S. 1979. *Developmental Research on Candidate Instrumentation: Results and Recommendations; Report Submitted to the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.*
Kinder, D., Peters, M., Abelson, R., & Fiske, S. 1980. *Presidential Prototypes*, in «Political Behavior», vol. 2, pp. 315-37.
King, A. 2002. *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Letki, N. 2006. *Investigating the Roots of Civic Morality: Trust, Social Capital, and Institutional Performance,* in «Political Behavior», vol. 28, pp. 305-325.
Maraffi, M. 2002. *Per cosa si è votato il 13 Maggio? Le mappe cognitive degli elettori italiani*, in *Le ragioni dell'elettore: perché ha vinto il centro-destra nelle elezioni italiane del 2001*, edited by M. Caciagli & P. Corbetta, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 301-338.
Matthews, G., Deary, I., & Whiteman, M. 2003. *Personality Traits*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Mazzoleni, G. (1996) *Patterns and Effects of Recent Changes in Electoral Campaigning in Italy*, in Swanson & Mancini (1996), pp. 193-206.
McAllister, I. 2000. *Keeping them Honest: Public and Elite Perceptions of Ethical Conduct among Australian Legislators,* in «Political Studies», vol. 48, pp. 22-37.
McAllister, I. 2007. *The Personalization of Politics*, in *Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, edited by R. Dalton & H. Klingemann, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 571-588.
McCurley, C., & Mondak, J. 1995. *Inspected by #1184063113: The Influence of Incumbents' Competence and Integrity in U.S. House Elections*, in «American Journal of Political Science», vol. 39, pp. 864-85.
Miller, A., & Miller, W. 1976. *Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality-a Rejoinder,* in «American Political Science Review», vol. 70, pp. 832-49.
Miller, A., Wattenberg, M., & Malanchuk, O. 1986. *Schematic assessments of presidential candidates*, in «American Political Science Review», vol. 80, pp. 521–540.
Miller, W., & Shanks, J. 1996. *The New American Voter*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Mondak, J. 1995. *Competence, Integrity, and the Electoral Success of Congressional Incumbents,* in «The Journal of Politics», vol. 57, pp. 1043-69.
Mughan, A. 2000. *Media and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections*, London, Palgrave.

Norris, P. 1999. *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance,* Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Ohr, D., & Oscarsson, H. 2003. *Leader Traits, Leader Image and Vote Choice*, in *Political Leaders and Democratic Elections,* edited by K. Aarts, A. Blais & H. Schmitt, Oxford, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
Orviska, M., & Hudson, J. 2002. *Tax evasion, civic duty and the law abiding citizen*, in «European Journal of Political Economy», vol. 19, pp. 83-102.
Pancer, S., Brown, S., & Barr, C. 1999. *Forming impressions of political leaders: A cross-national comparison*, in «Political Psychology», vol. 20, pp. 345–368.
Perrucci, T., & Villa, M. 2004. *Italy*, in *The Media and Elections,* edited by B. Lange & D. Ward, Mahwah Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 1-23.
Pierce, P. 1993. *Political Sophistication and the Use of Candidate Traits in Candidate Evaluation*, in «Political Psychology», vol. 14, pp. 21-36.
Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. 2005. *The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Rahat, G., & Shaefer, T. 2007. *The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949-2003*, in «Political Communication», vol. 24, pp. 65-80.
Renwick, A., Hanretty, C., & Hine, D. 2009. *Partisan self-interest and electoral reform. The new Italian electoral law of 2005,* in «Electoral Studies», vol. 28, pp. 437-447.
Ricolfi, L. 2002. *La frattura etica. La ragionevole sconfitta della sinistra,* Napoli, L'Ancora del Mediterraneo.
Rokeach, M. 1973. *The Nature of Human Values,* New York, The Free Press.
Sani, G. 2002. *Il Fattore B*, in *Le ragioni dell'elettore. Perché ha vinto il centro-destra nelle elezioni italiane del 2001*, edited by M. Caciagli & P. Corbetta, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 275-299.
Sigel, R. 1964. *Effect of Partisanship on the Perception of Political Candidates*, in «Public Opinion Quarterly», vol. 28, pp. 483-496.
Song, Y., & Yarbrough, T. 1978. *Tax ethics and taxpayer attitudes: A survey*, in «Public Administration Review», vol. 38, pp. 442-452.
Swanson, D., & Mancini, P. 1996. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and Their Consequences*, Westport CT, Praeger.
Venturino, F. 2000. *La personalizzazione della politica italiana. Il ruolo dei leader nelle elezioni del 1996,* in «Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica», vol. 30, pp. 295-327.
Wattenberg, M. 1991. *The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Wilson, J., & Banfield, E. 1964. *Public-Regardiness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior,* in «American Political Science Review», vol. 59, pp. 876-887.
Wilson, J., & Banfield, E. 1971. *Political Ethos Revisited,* in «American Political Science Review», vol. 65, pp. 1048-1062.

CIRCaP OCCASIONAL PAPERS

n. 1/1998 **Maurizio Cotta**, **Alfio Mastropaolo and Luca Verzichelli,** *Italy: Parliamentary elite transformations along the discontinuous road of democratization*

n. 2/1998 **Paolo Bellucci and Pierangelo Isernia**, *Massacring in front of a blind audience*

n. 3/1998 **Sergio Fabbrini**, *Chi guida l'esecutivo? Presidenza della Repubblica e Governo in Italia (1996-1998)*

n. 4/1999 **Simona Oreglia,** *Opinione pubblica e politica estera. L'ipotesi di stabilità e razionalità del pubblico francese in prospettiva comparata*

n. 5/1999 **Robert Dahl,** *The past and future of democracy*

n. 6/1999 **Maurizio Cotta,** *On the relationship between party and government*

n. 7/2000 **Jean Blondel,** *Formation, life and responsibility of the European executive*

n. 8/2000 **Maurice Croisat e Jean Marcou,** *Lo stato e le collettività locali: la tradizione francese*

n. 9/2002 **Maurizio Cotta,** *Il secondo governo Berlusconi* n. 10/2002**Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia,** *Reactions to the 9/11 2001 terrorist attack in countries outside the US*

n. 11/2003 **José M. Magone,** *Exporting Governance: the relations of the EU with other regions of the world*

n. 12/2003 **Nicolò Conti and Luca Verzichelli,** *The European dimension of political discourse in Italy. A longitudinal analysis of party preferences (1950-2001)*

n. 13/2003 **A. Andreev Svetlozar,** *The Role of Institutions in the Consolidation of Democracy in Post-communist Eastern Europe*

n. 14/2005 **Filippo Tronconi and Luca Verzichelli,** *Parliamentary Elites of New European Party Families: Unsuccessful Challenges or Chaotic Signs of Change?*

n. 15/2005 **Francesco Olmastroni**, *Popolarità di gabinetto al debutto di ventidue crisi internazionali britanniche. Revisione del rally 'round the flag effect*

n. 16/2005 **Jean Blondel,** *The Links between Western European Parties and their Supporters. The Role of Personalisation*

n. 17/2006 **Nicolò Conti, Maurizo Cotta and Filippo Tronconi,** *The Cartelisation of the Italian Party System: one Step Forward and one Step Backward*

n. 18/2007 **Paolo Bellucci and Oliver Heath**, *The Political Salience of Social Cleavages in Italy, 1963-2006*

n. 19/2007 **Nicolò Conti,** *Italian Parties and their Programmatic Platforms: How Alternative?*

n. 20/ 2008 **Stefano Citernesi,** *Il Fallimento dell'Intelligence nel Caso Iracheno*

n. 21/2009 **Charlotte Taylor,** *The representation of immigrants in the Italian press*

n. 22/2009 Vincenzo Memoli, *Political Knowledge and Democratic Support in Italy*

CIRCaP
Centro Interdipartimentale di Ricerca sul Cambiamento Politico
Via A. Mattioli,10 53100 – SIENA
Tel. ++39 0577 235299 Fax ++39 0577 235292
e-mail: circap@unisi.it **web: http://www.gips.unisi.it/circap**